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Abstract
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redistribution in a modi￿ed median voter model where redistributive con￿ict
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inequality and mobility are not unambiguous but depend on factors such as how
mobility changes in di￿erent groups and causes of inequality. We also examine
the e￿ect of the length of electoral periods on redistribution and welfare for
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1Any man who is under 30, and is not a liberal, has not heart; and any
man who is over 30 and is not a conservative, has no brains. 1
1 Introduction
It is well known that income redistribution is more extensive in Western Europe than
in the US. Since the demand for redistribution in democracies is often thought to
increase with income inequality, and since the US income distribution is more unequal,
this is perceived as something of a puzzle. Similarly, looking at the development over
time it is interesting to note that the increase in earnings inequality in the US, as
well as in Europe, coincides with tax revolts and retreats in welfare state ambitions.
Economic theory clearly lends some support to the idea that inequality increases
the demand for redistribution. However, there are di￿erent kinds of inequality, such as
inequality between groups in society, and variations in earnings over the individual’s
life-cycle, and these may have di￿erent e￿ects on the support for redistribution. 2 Some
types of inequality may even lead to less redistribution. For example, in a median
voter model, an in￿ow of poor immigrants may yield this result if their incomes are
su￿ciently low to reduce the mean income more than the median. (See Razin, Sadka
& Swagel, 2002). Similarly, high earnings mobility, (i.e., inequality over the life-cycle)
may reduce a forward-looking voter’s enthusiasm for redistribution, an idea which also
has some support in US data. (See, e.g., BØnabou & Ok, 2001, and Alesina & La
Ferrara, 2001.)
As for a comparison between the US and Europe, several authors note that dif-
ferences in income mobility between these seem quite small, e.g. the probabilities
of moving from one income quintile, or decile, to another are remarkably similar. 3
However, transition probabilities do not fully capture the incentives for redistribution
1This ￿orphan quote￿ exists in many versions. This wording has been attributed to Winston
Churchill but as Mark Shirey pointed out to us several earlier versions with other sources exist.
2For a broad discussion of inequality and its development over time in di￿erent countries, see
Gottschalk & Smeeding [1997].
3See e.g. BØnabou [2000] and Alesina, Glaeser & Sacerdote [2001]. Aaberge et al. [2002] ￿nd that
the relative reduction in inequality (Gini) from extending the accounting period is also very similar.
2since they do not re￿ect the value of transitions ￿ a value that is often much higher
in the US than in Europe.4
In this paper we examine the e￿ects of inequality and mobility in an integrated
median voter framework. We allow for both income di￿erences between groups and
individual income development over time. Concerning inequality, there is some am-
biguity about the e￿ects on redistribution in a median voter model, that depends
on how inequality is measured. For instance, there is no apparent correspondence
between the Gini-coe￿cient, and the support for redistribution. We examine a few
di￿erent aspects of inequality, including the comparison of current mean and median
income used in the basic median voter model. We ￿nd that, in the presence of mo-
bility, this comparison says very little about the support for redistributive policies.
Measures of between-group inequality are more informative. Moreover, the e￿ects
of changes in income mobility are not uniform but depend on in which group they
take place. These are some of the e￿ects examined in our model, which point to
the fruitfulness of examining inequality and mobility simultaneously. Yet, our anal-
ysis remains simple enough to allow various extensions, covering e.g. retirement and
baby-booms.
There are also other explanations for the di￿erence between Europe and the US.
For example, BØnabou [2000] presents a model based on incomplete insurance markets
and wealth-bias in voting participation. Explanations relating to social beliefs about
the fairness of market outcomes (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005), and trade and the
insurance function of a large public sector (Cameron, 1978, and Rodrik, 1998), have
also been proposed. Alesina et al. [2001] evaluate several explanations for the US￿
Europe redistribution puzzle and conclude that racial fragmentation may be amongst
the most important reasons for why there is less redistribution in the US. Moreover,
Glaeser & Alesina [2004], identify proportional representation as an important factor
4An OECD [1996] study reveals that if mobility is measured in terms of median-proportions
earnings bands, a measure taking absolute earnings di￿erences into account, the US has considerably
higher earnings mobility than the seven European countries included in the study. Another indication
that the US earnings distribution is more dispersed is that, in 1983, a transition from the ￿rst to
the tenth blue-collar wage decile implied an income increase of approximately 30 percent in Sweden,
200 percent in the UK, and 400 percent in the US (Hibbs & Locking, 2000).
3contributing to the rise of the welfare state in Europe. 5
Our basic model contains two groups of agents that di￿er both in average income
and income mobility. Income redistribution is determined by a majority vote and
takes the form of proportional taxes and ￿at transfers. Redistributive con￿ict can
take place both between groups and between generations. For example, old low-skilled
workers may earn more than the median income and vote against redistribution while
young high-skilled workers may be in favor of it. Furthermore, in the model we
abstract from income risk6, targeted transfers, interest groups and politicians.
The model shows that the e￿ects of mobility and inequality on the support for re-
distribution are not uniform but depend on the determinants of mobility and inequal-
ity. Higher mobility in low-skilled groups reduces the support for redistribution, while
higher mobility among the high-skilled has the opposite e￿ect. Increased inequality
between educational groups increases redistribution, but an increase in the number
of working poor can lead to less redistribution. We also ￿nd that the comparisons
between the current mean and median incomes in the population are uninformative
about the political support for redistribution.
Mobility and inequality di￿er across countries and over time and may help to
explain di￿erences and changes in redistributive policies. 7
The support for redistributive policies also depends on their expected duration
￿ long electoral periods lead to less redistribution in the model. Short periods can
5Recent research points to the importance of institutions as a link between voter preferences and
policy outcomes (see Persson & Tabellini, 2000). Besley & Case [2003] emphasize the empirical
shortcomings of the simple median voter model.
6Redistribution can serve as income insurance and the demand for this service should increase in
income risk. However, income risk seems higher in the US than in Europe which deepens the puzzle.
7Returns to experience may be shaped by technological changes. For instance, new CNC machin-
ery or integrated accounting and business management software may increase the return to experi-
ence for high-skilled workers while reducing it for low-skilled. When human capital is technology-
speci￿c, new technologies may imply steeper age-earnings pro￿les (Chari & Hopenhayn, 1991, and
Thompson, 2003). Such changes can also a￿ect income di￿erences between groups, e.g. technological
change may be skill biased. (See Berman, Bound & Griliches, 1994, and Bresnahan, 1999.)
Wage policies and labor market institutions di￿er across countries and can a￿ect income di￿erences
between groups (see Fortin & Lemieux, 1997) as well as age-earnings pro￿les. There are consider-
able country di￿erences in within-group wage development. See, e.g., Card & Lemieux [2001] and
Brunello & Comi [2004]. For example, the policies of wage-compression in Sweden have tended to
￿atten age-earnings pro￿les, while the system of company training in Japan may have caused steeper
age-earnings pro￿les (Klevmarken, 1982, and Hashimoto & Raisian, 1985).
4induce ￿myopia￿ in young high-skilled agents, who may vote for redistribution even
though they are better o￿ without it in a life-time perspective. However, despite
e￿ciency costs of taxation, low-skilled agents as a group bene￿t from redistribution.
In a majority vote on the length of the electoral period, the outcome is a period
long enough to remove any myopic incentives, which is not in the low-skilled group’s
interest. The median voter in this case is low-skilled and thus betrays her class
interest.
We also examine a fully funded retirement system and ￿nd that increased retire-
ment savings reduce redistribution but that the e￿ect of changing the retirement age
is ambiguous. Finally we consider the e￿ect of a baby-boom. A baby-boom has
a positive e￿ect on redistribution as the baby-boomers’ incomes, and thus the tax
base, grow. However, as baby-boomers age they become more conservative, and thus
the support for redistribution is reduced during the periods when baby-boomers are
median voters.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the basic model and
examine the e￿ects of mobility and inequality on equilibrium redistribution. We
also relate the level of redistribution to the di￿erence between the current mean and
median incomes. We then consider the length of electoral period. In sections 3 and
4 we consider the e￿ects of retirement and a baby boom. Section 5 o￿ers some
concluding remarks.
2 The model
Let the length of an individual’s life-span be equal to one and assume that new
individuals are born continuously at a constant rate so that the age distribution is
uniform. The population size is normalized to one. There are two types of agents, H-
agents and L-agents. Let p be the proportion of L-agents and 1−p the proportion of
H-agents in the population. For each type earnings are assumed to increase linearly
5with age, θ.8 The age-earnings pro￿le of an individual of type i is
yi(θ) = ai + biθ (1)
where i ∈ {H,L}. H-individuals have steeper age-earnings pro￿les than L-individuals.
The age-earnings pro￿les of H-agents do, however, have a lower intercept. If the
groups are taken to be de￿ned by high and low education this can represent earnings
foregone while investing in education. The age-earnings pro￿les are illustrated in
Figure 1a.








This is also the individual’s average income since the individual’s lifespan is normal-
ized to one. The average income in the population ¯ Y is simply the sum of the average
incomes of each type weighted by their frequency in the population,
¯ Y = p¯ yL + (1 − p)¯ yH. (3)
Since the size of the population is one, the average income equals the tax-base of the
economy.
Throughout we assume that the life-time income of H-individuals exceeds that of
L-individuals. In the educational interpretation the income di￿erence can be seen as
the premium required to compensate for non-pecuniary costs of education. Moreover,
we assume that the L-agents are in majority. In terms of the model parameters the
above assumptions amount to:
(A1) 0 < bL < bH and aH < aL
(A2) ∆¯ y = ¯ yH − ¯ yL > 0
(A3) p > 1
2
8Actual age-earnings pro￿les are concave and steeper pro￿les are associated with higher education
(Psacharopoulos & Layard, 1979, Murphy & Welch, 1992, Brunello & Comi, 2004). Pro￿les measured
from cross-section data show lower wages for older individuals. However, it does not necessarily follow
that individual earnings decline after some age. See Thornton, Rodgers & Brookshire [1997].
6The age-earnings pro￿les together with the composition of types in the population
determine the income distribution. Speci￿cally, the density function is given by
f(y) =

     
     
(1 − p)/bH if y ∈ [yH(0),yL(0)] ∪ [yL(1),yH(1)]
(1 − p)/bH + p/bL if y ∈ [yL(0),yL(1)]
0 otherwise.
(4)
Assumptions (A1) and (A2) imply that the income distribution is positively skewed
(see Figure 1b). Moreover, it is straightforward to show that the median income ˜ Y
falls short of the mean income ¯ Y (Lemma 1). Hence, the income distribution given
by expression (4) would result in positive redistribution in a standard median voter
model, not taking mobility into account. 9
Lemma 1 ¯ Y > ˜ Y .
Proof: ˜ Y is determined by:
R ˜ Y
yH(0) f(t)dt = 0.5. (A1) - (A3) imply that there is
a median income earner in each group. Thus ˜ Y =
pbH¯ yL+(1−p)bL¯ yH
pbH+(1−p)bL and ¯ Y − ˜ Y =
p(1−p)∆¯ y(bH−bL)
pbH+(1−p)bL > 0 by (A1) and (A2).
Figure 1 (a and b) about here
Taking earnings mobility into account, individual voting behavior is determined
by how the individual’s average income over the electoral period, δ, is a￿ected by the
tax and transfer policies under consideration. The parameter δ can also be interpreted
as a proxy for the duration of redistributive policies. For simplicity, we abstract from








θ yi(t)dt = yi(θ) +
bi




θ yi(t)dt = yi(θ) +
bi
2 (1 − θ) if 1 − θ < δ
(5)
where yi(θ) is the individual’s income at the beginning of the electoral period, and
the second term is the average increase in income during the period. The upper
expression applies if the individual’s remaining life-time, 1 − θ, exceeds the electoral
9See, e.g., Meltzer & Richard [1981].
7period and the lower if it does not. In both cases average earnings increase in age
but for older agents, θ > 1−δ, the rate of increase is only half of that for the young,
since the maximum income remains constant for old agents.
Redistribution is assumed to be achieved through ￿xed transfers ￿nanced by pro-
portional taxes. Taxation is costly and we assume that the cost is quadratic in the
tax rate and given by
ρτ2
2 ¯ Y , where ρ measures the e￿ciency of the tax system and
0 < ρ ≤ 2. Assuming budget balance a tax τ su￿ces to ￿nance a per capita transfer
equal to τ(1−
ρτ
2 )¯ Y . For an agent of type i and age θ the average period income after
taxes and transfers is
¯ Υi(τ,θ) = (1 − τ)¯ yi(θ) + τ(1 −
ρτ
2
)¯ Y . (6)
The optimal tax rate for the individual strikes a balance between the marginal in-
creases in bene￿ts and tax payments resulting from a higher tax rate, i.e.
(1 − ρτ)¯ Y − ¯ yi(θ) ≤ 0 (7)








Note that since ¯ yi(θ) is strictly increasing in θ this tax rate decreases with age.
Hence, for any given τ we can implicitly de￿ne a threshold age for each type, θi(τ),
using (8) and (5), such that all individuals younger than this prefer τ to any lower
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Very high τ are not even supported by the youngest, and θi(τ) = 0. More moderate
tax rates gather wider support and may even attract some older L-types, i.e. with
θL ≥ 1 − δ. By assumption, old H-types have a period income above ¯ Y and are not
interested in redistribution. Note that the θi(τ)s are continuous and decreasing in τ
and strictly so for τ such that θi(τ) > 0.
8The political support for a given tax rate τ can now be expressed in terms of the
fraction of the population that prefers τ to any lower tax rate, Φ(τ), where
Φ(τ) = pθL(τ) + (1 − p)θH(τ). (10)
By construction Φ is continuous and decreasing in τ (and ρ) and strictly so for Φ > 0.
Moreover, Φ(τ) = 0 for su￿ciently high tax rates and clearly so for τ ∈ [1
ρ,1]. Hence,
Proposition 1 (i) If Φ(0) ≤ 0.5 then τ∗ = 0. (ii) If Φ(0) > 0.5 there is a unique
τ∗ > 0, de￿ned by Φ(τ∗) = 0.5, that wins over every other τ in pairwise comparisons
(a Condorcet winner) and θH(τ∗) < 0.5 < θL(τ∗). (iii) τ∗ > 0 decreases in ρ.
Proof: In (i) a majority, 1 − Φ(0), prefers a lower τ. Since Φ decreases in τ this
holds strictly for any τ > 0. (ii) Since Φ is continuous and decreasing in τ and
Φ(τ) = 0 for τ su￿ciently close to 0.5 there exists a τ∗ such that Φ(τ∗) = 0.5. It also
follows that if τ is such that Φ(τ) > 0.5 then τ < τ∗. Hence, by de￿nition a majority
prefers τ∗ to τ. A parallel argument holds for τ such that Φ(τ) < 0.5. Finally, since
¯ yH(0.5) > ¯ Y , H-agents older than 0.5 strictly prefer τ = 0 which implies θH(τ∗) < 0.5.
Since Φ(τ∗) = 0.5 it follows that θL(τ∗) > 0.5. (iii) The equilibrium condition only
determines the product τ∗ρ. 
Thus, if there is majority support for a positive tax rate, there exists a unique
equilibrium tax rate, which increases in the e￿ciency of the tax system.
2.1 Mobility and inequality
Let us now consider the e￿ects of income mobility and inequality on equilibrium
redistribution. First we examine the e￿ect of increased mobility. To isolate the mo-
bility e￿ect we examine changes in the slope of age-earnings pro￿les, while adjusting
the intercept to keep the average income in each group constant. This removes the
inter-group redistribution motive.
Proposition 2 An increase in bL, compensated by a decrease in aL such that ¯ yL
remains constant, strictly decreases τ∗ for τ∗ > 0. The reverse is true for a com-
9pensated increase in bH. A proportional compensated increase in bL and bH strictly
decreases τ∗.
Proof: In the Appendix.
A compensated increase in mobility decreases the incomes of young individuals and
increases the incomes of the old. Since a threshold L-voter is relatively old, θL(τ∗) >
0.5, she bene￿ts from increased mobility and becomes less interested in redistribution.
The opposite is true for a threshold H-voter. A proportional compensated increase
in mobility for both groups leads to less redistribution since the negative e￿ect in the
L-group dominates the positive e￿ect in the smaller H-group.
Next we consider how income inequality a￿ects redistribution. Inequality may
occur in di￿erent dimensions, such as income di￿erences between social classes or
educational groups, over the life-cycle, or between generations. The political signi￿-
cance of between-group inequality is also likely to be a￿ected by the size of the various
groups.
There is an extensive literature on income inequality, containing various mea-
sures of inequality. Many measures, such as Gini-coe￿cients, ratios of decile incomes
e.g. the 90/10-ratio, and the mean versus median income comparison common in the-
oretical median voter models, capture both permanent and transitory income inequal-
ity. Short term ￿uctuations in individual income, e.g. re￿ecting brief unemployment
spells, or low initial incomes re￿ecting study or apprenticeship periods, have di￿er-
ent political implications than lasting income inequality. Some studies try to ￿lter
out non-permanent income inequality by extending the accounting period over which
income is measured. (See e.g. Aaberge et al., 2002.)
Below, we ￿rst consider the e￿ect on redistribution of changes in permanent in-
equality, keeping mobility constant. Second, we examine the applicability of the mean
vs median comparison as a predictor of the existence and extent of redistribution in
our model. Finally, we study the e￿ect of changes in the relative size of di￿erent
income groups in the population.
If we keep mobility constant in our model, changes in inequality can only occur
10through changes in the respective group’s initial incomes.
Proposition 3 An increase in aL strictly decreases τ∗ for τ∗ > 0. The reverse is
true for an increase in aH.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Thus, increased inequality between groups unambiguously increases redistribu-
tion. As we shall see later, this result may not hold if groups of voters with persistently
low or high incomes, who never become median voters, are introduced.
Now, let us turn to the mean vs median measure of inequality. As in all median
voter models, the equilibrium tax rate in our model is determined by the voter with
the median income. However, the relevant income concept in our model is the average
income over the electoral period, ¯ yi(θ), a forward looking concept. Mobility makes
the corresponding income distribution di￿er from the distribution of current incomes.
Consequently, a comparison of the current mean versus median income, ¯ Y > ˜ Y , may
not correctly re￿ect incentives for redistribution.
Below we examine the extent to which income inequality measured as the dif-
ference between the current mean and median incomes can explain the existence of
income redistribution. Moreover, we examine whether a more unequal income distri-
bution, as measured by this income di￿erence, is associated with more redistribution
in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (i) ¯ Y − ˜ Y > 0 ⇒ Φ(0) > 0.5 if and only if δ = 0. (ii) Consider two
income distributions f(y) and f(y)0. Then ¯ Y − ˜ Y ≤ ¯ Y 0 − ˜ Y 0 does not imply τ∗ ≤ τ∗0.
Proof: In the Appendix.
In conclusion, the mean versus median comparison is an insu￿cient condition
for the occurrence of redistribution. 10 It is also uninformative about the relative
support for redistribution in comparisons between di￿erent income distributions, i.e.,
increased inequality as measured by ¯ Y − ˜ Y is not necessarily associated with more
income redistribution.
10In fact, this criterion is su￿cient only when the duration of redistributive policies is in￿nitely
short. Note that if bL = bH = 0 the income distribution degenerates to two points, at aL and aH.
Hence, ¯ Y > ˜ Y then implies a strictly positive tax rate.
11Finally, we discuss the composition of the population in terms of the proportions
of low skilled, p. This factor can di￿er considerably between countries. 11 A change
in p has two opposing e￿ects: The direct e￿ect of a higher p is to increase the
support for redistribution. However, such a change also erodes the tax base and
makes redistribution less attractive to median income voters. The net e￿ect cannot
generally be signed. Four cases arise depending on whether θL ≷ 1 − δ and θH > 0.
Below we consider the case where electoral periods are short.
Proposition 5: τ∗ is quasi-concave in p for τ∗ > 0 and δ such that θL < 1 − δ and
θH > 0.
Proof: In the Appendix.
This suggests that an inverse U-shaped pattern could exist between p and the
equilibrium tax rate. (Obviously, at the respective end points, p = 0 and p = 1, the
equilibrium tax rate would be zero.)
2.2 The in￿uence of non-median voter groups
So far we have assumed that all individuals start out with below-average incomes
but eventually attain incomes above this level. In reality, some groups have bleak
prospects of ever attaining the average income, e.g. agents who face long-term unem-
ployment or face little or no wage development over time (￿working poor￿). Others
may have above average incomes throughout their working lives.
Naturally, working poor prefer more redistribution than the median voter while
the opposite holds for those with consistently high incomes. Hence, the direct e￿ect
of an increased number of poor voters, say due to changing labor market conditions or
migration, is to increase the support for redistribution. There is also a counteracting
indirect e￿ect caused by the reduction in the mean income, which lowers the feasible
transfer level and reduces the median voter’s enthusiasm for redistribution. 12
11See Blondal, Field & Girouard [2002]. Ultimately the proportion of skilled workers is endogenous
and is in￿uenced by the expected degree of redistribution in the future. However, this is beyond
the scope of our analysis. See Hassler, Rodr￿guez-Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti [2003] for an
interesting contribution in this vein.
12Razin, Sadka & Swagel [2002] call this e￿ect ￿scal leakage. They model the e￿ects of migration
12We brie￿y consider this tradeo￿. Suppose a small fraction of the population
γ has a constant income, ¯ yP < ¯ yL. The mean income in the population is then
¯ YNM = (1 − γ)¯ Y + γ¯ yP. The threshold ages are still given by (9), using ¯ YNM as
de￿ned above instead of ¯ Y . In analogy with (10) the poverty-adjusted equilibrium
tax condition is
Φ(τ
∗) = (1 − γ)[pθL(τ
∗) + (1 − p)θH(τ
∗)] + γ ≡ 0.5 (11)
where Φ(τ) is continuous in γ. We illustrate the possibility that a higher γ can lead
to less redistribution in the case when θL(τ∗) < 1−δ and θH(τ∗) > 0. Using (11), the
￿rst derivative of Φ(τ∗) with respect to γ evaluated at γ = 0, can be expressed as
p
(1 − ρτ∗)¯ yP − ¯ yL(0)
bL
+ (1 − p)
(1 − ρτ∗)¯ yP − ¯ yH(0)
bH
. (12)
The support for redistribution tends to increase in γ if ρτ∗ is small, which is the case if
income di￿erences between groups is small and mobility high, and ¯ yi(0) is low, which
is the case for small δ. Conversely, the support for redistribution initially decreases
in γ if ¯ yP is less than min{¯ yL(0), ¯ yH(0)}, i.e., if the poor are poorer than even the
youngest L and H voters. (When electoral periods are long, this is more likely to be
the case. If δ = 1 it is always the case.) Note that the incidence of persistent poverty,
or low pay, seems to be higher in the US and the UK than in other OECD countries
(see OECD, 1997, chapter 2). The former also have less extensive redistribution.
2.3 Empirical illustration
Our model implies that increased income mobility for L-voters (the majority group)
should lead to less redistribution. Furthermore, Proposition 5 suggests than an in-
verted U-shaped relation could exist between transfers and the relative size of educa-
tional groups. Below we take a brief look at how this compares with actual patterns
of redistribution, education and mobility.
on redistribution and examine the relative importance of the above e￿ects using data on eleven
European countries. They ￿nd that the ￿scal leakage e￿ect is important and may dominate.
13We have data on redistribution, mobility and education for 20 OECD countries. 13
The level of redistribution (τ in the model) is measured as Public social expenditure as
percentage of GDP, for OECD countries for the year 1997 (Roman et al. [2001]). Our
mobility measure is The percentage increase in income when moving from quintile 3
to quintile 4 in the market income distribution. 14 15 The proportion of L-types (p in
the model) is measured as the percentages with Less than upper secondary and Upper
secondary education (OECD, 1998).
An OLS regression of social spending on income mobility, the proportion of une-
ducated, and this variable squared, yields the following results.










where t-values are in parentheses. The signs of all three coe￿cients are consistent
with the predictions of the model.
3 Electoral periods and ￿myopia￿
In a life-time perspective, H-agents are clearly better o￿ with no redistribution. Since
taxation is costly and short electoral periods induce strong redistribution incentives,
this could perhaps also be true for L-agents. However, this is not the case.
Proposition 6 The L-individual’s life-time income is higher with equilibrium redis-
tribution than with no redistribution.
13The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, UK and US.
14We use decile data from the WIDER World Income Inequality Database,
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm (the shares are estimated from Luxembourg In-
come Study data). For some countries data is not available after 1986, and for commensurability
we have chosen available years between 1985-92.
15Ideally, we would like a measure that captures both di￿erences in transition probabilities and the
magnitude of income changes. Transition probabilities between equal-width earnings bands (de￿ned
as proportions of the median wage) has this feature but is only available for six countries. (See OECD,
1996, chapter 3). Since the quintile transition probabilities are quite similar between countries we
have instead chosen to only measure the income di￿erences between the quintiles. Moreover, we
would have liked to have group speci￿c mobility measures. There are country studies of education
speci￿c age-earnings pro￿les but cross-country comparisons are problematic. (See, e.g., Brunello &
Comi, 2004.) Since the proportion with low education is generally quite large (the average is 79.4),
we interpret the measure as mainly re￿ecting income mobility for individuals with low education.
14Proof: An L-agent’s life-time after-tax income plus transfers, (1−τ)¯ yL+τ(1−
ρτ∗
2 )¯ Y =
1
2(¯ Y + ¯ yL(θL(τ∗))), exceeds her gross life time income, ¯ yL, since θL(τ∗) > 1
2.
The median L-voter is of above-average age and has an income above ¯ yL. If τ∗ > 0
this voter obviously gains from taxation. Since the net gain from taxation decreases
linearly with age, the aggregate gains for the younger L-voters outweigh the aggregate
losses for the older. (Concave age-earnings pro￿les are likely to accentuate this e￿ect.)
The support for redistribution is in￿uenced by the duration of redistributive poli-
cies, or the length of the electoral period, δ. As would be expected, a longer time
horizon tends to decrease income redistribution. 16 Speci￿cally,
Proposition 7 τ∗ decreases in δ and strictly so for θH(τ∗) > 0 and/or θL(τ∗) < 1−δ.
Proof: In the Appendix.
An increase in δ also a￿ects the composition of the voter support for redistribution.
It raises the period income, which reduces θi, but the decrease in τ (Proposition 7)
has a positive indirect e￿ect on θi. The latter e￿ect is stronger for L-types, whose
age-earnings pro￿les are less steep. Since Φ(τ∗) = 0.5 in equilibrium, changes in θL
and θH must have opposite signs. Thus, θL increases and θH decreases in δ. (If no
H-type supports τ∗ then Φ(τ∗) = pθL(τ∗) and δ will not a￿ect θL(τ∗)). Formally,
Corollary 1 θH(τ∗) strictly decreases and θL(τ∗) strictly increases in δ for δ such
that θH(τ∗) > 0.
Proof: In the Appendix.
We could say that the longer the electoral periods, the more the dividing line in
the redistributional con￿ict goes between skill-groups (classes), while with shorter
electoral periods the dividing line goes between age groups (generations).
How, then, does the length of the electoral period a￿ect the welfare of the di￿erent
groups? Proposition 6 tells us that L-types are better o￿ with equilibrium redistri-
bution than with no redistribution but is silent about whether more, or slightly less,
redistribution would be even better. However, the results, in Corollary 2 below, are
in line with Proposition 6.
16This result is similar to that in proposition 2 in BØnabou and Ok [2001].
15Corollary 2 For τ∗ > 0, the life-time income for L-agents decreases in δ. The
life-time income for H-agents increases in δ.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Thus, the groups have diametrically opposing interests concerning the length of the
electoral period.
Ultimately the length of the electoral period is determined in a political process,
where also considerations such as political accountability are likely to be important.
Below we examine this choice, but focus exclusively on the redistributive aspects.
Consider an extension of the model where the electorate ￿rst faces a once-and-for-all
vote on δ and then votes on τ in subsequent elections. Once δ is set, τ∗ will be the
same in all future elections. Hence, when voting on δ agents are concerned with the















The marginal e￿ect of a higher δ on ¯ ΥRL
i (τ∗(δ),θ) is a product of two factors,
∂¯ ΥRL
i /∂τ and ∂τ∗/∂δ. Since ¯ ΥRL
i (τ∗(δ),θ) ≥ ¯ Υi(τ,θ) the ￿rst factor is negative
for the median voter. Thus for ∂τ∗/∂δ < 0 (Proposition 7) the product is strictly
positive. This means that the constitutionally selected δ must be su￿ciently long for
θH(τ∗) = 0 and θL(τ∗) ≥ 1 − δ. Any such electoral period yields the same degree
of redistribution as if the electoral period had covered the remaining life-span for all
voters. In sum,
Proposition 8 (i) There exists a δ such that τ∗(δ) = τ∗(1) for δ ∈ [δ,1]. (ii) The
equilibrium δ ≥ δ.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Hence, constitutional voting results in very long electoral periods and a low level of
redistribution. This outcome is not favorable for L-types. The reason it still receives
the necessary support is, of course, that the median voter is an older L-individual
who has no incentives to take care of the welfare of coming generations of L-agents.
164 Retirement
The assumption that earnings increase throughout the voter’s life-span does not ac-
cord with the fact that people do retire. Below we study a mandatory fully funded
retirement system where individual bene￿ts are determined by individual contribu-
tions and the retirement age. Retirees may favor redistribution and the support for
redistribution depends on the size of bene￿ts. We focus on how changes in contribu-
tions and the retirement age a￿ect equilibrium redistribution.
Let retirement bene￿ts be ￿nanced by ￿at deductions, di, from agents’ taxable
income throughout their working lives, i.e. yi(θ) = ai+biθ−di. Accumulated savings
are paid out from the retirement age, r, as a ￿at taxable retirement income di
r
1−r.
For incomes to remain non-negative we require that ai > di. For simplicity we assume
that δ = 1. Now, three groups are potentially in favor of redistribution, young L-types
and agents of both types approaching retirement (when δ = 1, θH(τ∗) = 0).
Figure 2 about here














2 (r + θ)

(r − θ) + diθ

if θ ≤ r
dir
1−r if θ > r
(13)
which is strictly quasi-concave in θ.17 Since retirees may also strictly favor redistri-
bution, and by continuity some individuals close to retirement, there may exist two
upper threshold ages, θR
L(τ) and θR
H(τ) respectively, above which agents favor more
redistribution. All thresholds are implicitly de￿ned by
(1 − ρτ)¯ Y (r) = ¯ yi(θ) (14)
The support for redistribution is Φ(τ) = p[θL(τ) + 1 − θR
L(τ)] + (1 − p)[1 − θR
H(τ)].












17We now examine the e￿ects of retirement savings, di, on redistribution. Higher
contributions reduce the disposable income of those who work while making retirees
better o￿. Consequently, θL decreases while the upper thresholds increase. Hence,
Proposition 9 The equilibrium tax decreases in pension contributions.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Now, let us consider the e￿ects of changes in the retirement age. A higher retire-
ment age raises the period (life-time) incomes, ¯ yi(θ), for all voters, but it also increases
the tax base, ¯ Y . The net e￿ect on the equilibrium tax cannot be determined. Below
we consider the e￿ects on the support for redistribution in the di￿erent groups.
Proposition 10 An increase in r strictly increases θR
H. The support for redistribu-
tion in the L-group, θL(τ) + 1 − θR
L(τ), may increase or decrease but both θL and θR
L
cannot decrease.
Proof: In the Appendix.
The ￿rst result follows since for H-types a higher r increases the income more than
the tax base. For L-types, a higher r bene￿ts old voters more than young ones.
5 An ageing baby-boom
Demographic changes, such as baby-booms, declining nativity and wars alter the age
structure of the population and have economic and political e￿ects that evolve and
change over time. One currently much discussed issue is what e￿ect the ageing of
the 1940s baby-boom will have on welfare state arrangements. Below we examine
how the support for redistributive policies is a￿ected by a baby-boom in our model.
We abstract from retirement in the analysis but provide a simple numerical example
concerning the timing of welfare state reforms, where we take retirement into account.
A baby-boom gives increased political clout to its age group, and as the group ages,
its taste for income redistribution subsides. However, the rising incomes of the baby-
boomers increases the tax base and make others more interested in redistribution.
18The interaction between these e￿ects determines how the support for redistribution
changes over time.
To simplify the analysis we assume that the baby-boom occurs at a single point in
time and that it constitutes a fraction, γ, of the population. The proportions of L and
H-individuals in the baby-boom are the same as in the rest of the population. The
income of the baby-boomers is yB(θB) = pyL(θB)+(1−p)yH(θB), where yi(θB) is given
by (1). The average income in the population is ¯ Y = (1 − γ)¯ YNB + γyB(θB), where
¯ YNB is the average income of non-baby-boomers. Since θH(τ) < θL(τ), the support for
a tax τ, Φ(τ,θB) as a function of θB, is determined in one of three regimes, di￿ering
in the fraction of baby-boomers who support higher taxes, Γ(τ,θB).




     
     
1 if θB ≤ θH(τ,θB)
p if θH(τ,θB) ≤ θB ≤ θL(τ,θB)
0 otherwise
The function Γ describes three phases in the baby-boom’s e￿ect on the support
for redistribution. Initially, the baby-boom may increase or decrease the support for
redistribution, since yB(0) < ¯ Y (cf. the case with a group of permanently poor). 18
Generally, as long as no baby-boomer is a median voter, their rising incomes increase
the support for redistribution over time. As θB reaches θi, some baby-boomers become
median voters, and remain so for an interval of time. (An ordinary voter is only a
median voter for an instant before being replaced by a slightly younger voter. By
contrast baby-boomers remain median voter for as long as it takes to replace the
whole group). During this time the support for taxation must decrease. Since there
are at most two thresholds, θH and θL, a baby-boom can create one or two ￿cycles￿







− (1 − γ)










which is positive if ¯ YNB − yB(θB) is not too large but may otherwise be negative.
19with increasing and then decreasing support for redistribution. Note that the extent
to which this translates into corresponding variations in the tax rate depends on the
frequency of elections, i.e., δ. Figure 3 illustrates a case with δ = 0.
Figure 3 about here
Now, let us consider a simple numerical example concerning the timing of the (second)
peak of welfare state spending, where we take retirement into account. Suppose agents
vote between the ages of 20 and 80 years and retire at 60. Moreover, suppose (the
parameters are such that) all H-types, including retirees, vote for lower taxes, while
retired L-types vote for higher taxes. If we abstract from forward-looking behavior of
L-types approaching retirement, we can approximate the condition determining the







where the ￿rst term re￿ects the support for higher taxes from individuals in working
age and the second term that from retired L-types. Suppose ￿nally that p = 0.8,
implying that θL ' 0.44. This translates into a physical age of 20 + 60 · 0.44 = 46.4
years. If the baby-boom began in 1945, then welfare state spending would have
peaked in 1991. While this lags somewhat behind the tax reforms and the retreats in
European welfare states, there are obviously many factors not accounted for in this
example. For instance, the presence of working poor would tend to shift the peak
year back in time. Taking forward-looking behavior into account would also have this
e￿ect. By contrast, a higher p, or a later retirement age, would have the opposite
e￿ect.
6 Concluding remarks
The median voter model in its most narrow form has not been entirely successful in
explaining redistribution. Extended versions of the model seem to perform better
20(see e.g. BØnabou & Ok, 2001, who consider mobility, and Razin, Sadka & Swagel,
2002, who consider between-group inequality).
In this paper we have examined how income mobility and income inequality inter-
act in determining income redistribution in a modi￿ed median voter model. Mobility
and inequality can arise in di￿erent ways, e.g., mobility may di￿er between groups,
and inequality can exist between generations as well as between groups. The model
shows that the e￿ects of mobility and inequality on the support for redistribution are
not uniform but depend on the determinants of mobility and inequality. For exam-
ple, higher mobility in low-skilled groups reduces the support for redistribution, while
higher mobility among the high-skilled has the opposite e￿ect. Also, a wider income
gap between educational groups tends to increase redistribution but an increase in
the number of working poor can lead to less redistribution.
We also examine the traditional comparison between the current mean and median
incomes in the population in the context of our model, and ￿nd that such compar-
isons are uninformative about the political support for redistribution. Moreover, we
consider the e￿ect of the length of electoral periods. Short periods accentuate the
redistributive con￿ict between generations while long periods make the equilibrium
tax rate more sensitive to between-group inequality. A majority vote on the period
length minimizes the equilibrium tax rate, to the detriment of low-skilled voters.
We believe that it would be valuable to study these issues empirically, as more com-
parable cross-country data on mobility and earnings in di￿erent educational groups
becomes available. Our admittedly very rough empirical illustration is somewhat
encouraging in this respect.
21Appendix











∂ai, which is derived by di￿erentiating the threshold θi(τ)s with
respect to bi while imposing d¯ yi = dai + 1
2dbi = 0. Since ¯ Y remains constant, the























since Φ is strictly decreasing in τ.
The partial derivatives of the θi(τ)s (expression (9)) depend on whether the age
of the threshold agent is above or below 1−δ. Excluding θL = 0 since θL(τ∗) > 0 for




















































































which gives the result.
A proportional compensated increase in bL and bH is de￿ned as an increase in β and








∂β at αi = β = 1. Again excluding θL = 0,
∂θL
∂β = {1−δ
2 − θL,−θL}, which is negative in both cases, and
∂θH





∂β + (1 − p)
∂θH
∂β < 0 in all cases since pθL + (1 − p)θH = 1
2.
Proof of Proposition 3: The e￿ects on τ are derived implicitly from Φ(τ∗) ≡ 0.5.




∂ai + (1 − p)
∂θH




∂aH, given in the















22since ¯ Y is not constant. For each of the comparative static e￿ects there are four
possible cases: θL(τ∗) ≤ 1 − δ and θH(τ∗) = 0; θL(τ∗) ≤ 1 − δ and θH(τ∗) > 0;
θL(τ∗) > 1 − δ and θH(τ∗) = 0; θL(τ∗) > 1 − δ and θH(τ∗) > 0. We compute ∂Φ
∂ai for
each case, using Φ(τ∗) ≡ 0.5, assumptions (A1) - (A3) and Proposition 1. The e￿ects








































































where H2 and H4 follow since Proposition 1 (ii), θL(τ∗) > 0.5, implies that
(1 − ρτ)[
pbH








[ ¯ yL+(1−p)∆¯ y] > 1
since by (A1) and (A2) p(bH − bL) > ∆¯ y.


















only requires ∆¯ y > 0, Φ(0) = pθL(0) + (1 − p)θH(0) < 0.5 for any su￿ciently small
∆¯ y. But if δ = 0 then Φ(0) = 1






> 0.5. (ii) Suppose f(y)
is such that τ∗ > 0 and θH(τ∗) = 0. We construct f(y)0 from f(y) by compensated
changes in bi. A small compensated increase in bL (bH) strictly increases (decreases)
˜ Y , while ¯ Y remains unchanged, i.e. ¯ Y 0 = ¯ Y . We can balance compensated increases
in bL and bH so that ˜ Y 0 = ˜ Y . However, Proposition 2 implies τ∗ > τ∗0, i.e. a contra-
diction. Moreover, an additional slight increase in bH yields ¯ Y − ˜ Y < ¯ Y 0 − ˜ Y 0 and
τ∗ > τ∗0. 











∂p + (1 − p)
∂θH
∂p + θL − θH
p
∂θL
















and is negative for ∂Φ
∂p = 0 since ∂Φ





∂p ) < 0 (see expression
(9)).
Proof of Proposition 7: The e￿ect of δ on τ∗ can be derived implicitly from
Φ(τ∗) ≡ 0.5: ∂τ
∂δ = −∂Φ
∂δ /∂Φ
∂τ . It is straightforward to show, using (9), that the
denominator is strictly negative for θL(τ∗,δ) > 0, which is true for any τ∗ ≥ 0.
Similarly, it is easy to see that ∂Φ
∂δ ≤ 0 with equality only if both θL(τ∗) > 1 − δ and



















∂δ = 0 and thus the partial derivatives for the di￿erent
types must have opposite signs. We now evaluate
dθi
dδ for the di￿erent cases that can
arise in equation (9).
Since θL(τ∗,δ) > 0 we only need to consider whether θL(τ∗) > 1 − δ or not, and
whether θH(τ∗) = 0 or not. If θH(τ∗) = 0, then
dθH
dδ = 0 which implies that also
dθL
dδ = 0. If θH(τ∗) > 0 and θL(τ∗) > 1 − δ then
∂θL
∂δ = 0 and thus
dθL
dδ > 0 and
therefore
dθH










∂τ < 0 we again have that
dθL
dδ > 0 and
dθH
dδ < 0.
Proof of Corollary 2: The life-time income as a function of δ is ¯ Υi(τ∗(δ),0) =
(1−τ∗(δ))¯ yi+τ∗(δ)(1−
ρτ∗(δ)
2 )¯ Y . The e￿ect of δ goes only via τ∗. For τ∗ > 0, condition
(7) holds with equality, i.e., (1 − ρτ∗)¯ Y − ¯ yL(θL) = 0 implying that ∂¯ ΥL/∂τ > 0.
By Proposition 7, ∂τ/∂δ ≤ 0 and for su￿ciently low δ this holds strictly. For H-
types, ¯ yH > ¯ yH(θH) and thus we have that ∂¯ ΥH/∂τ < 0, unless θH(τ) = 0 when
∂¯ ΥH/∂τ = 0, which gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 8:
(i) For su￿ciently large δ ∈ [0,1), θH(τ∗,δ) = 0 and θL(τ∗,δ) ≥ 1 − δ. The reason is
that both ¯ Y − ¯ yH(0,δ) and 1 − δ − θL(τ∗,δ) decrease monotonically in δ and equal
24zero for a su￿ciently large δ. Hence there exists a lowest δ, δ, such that θH(τ∗,δ) = 0
and θL(τ∗,δ) ≥ 1 − δ. By Proposition 7, τ∗ is una￿ected by further increases in δ.
(ii) Note that ∂¯ ΥRL
i /∂τ ≤ ∂¯ Υi/∂τ, where strict inequality holds for θi < 1−δ since the
remaining lifetime then exceeds δ. Furthermore, for the median voter ∂¯ Υi/∂τ = 0 at
τ∗. Hence, if θH(τ∗) > 0 or θL(τ∗) < 1−δ we have that ∂¯ ΥRL
i /∂τ < 0 for the median
voter, who then prefers higher δ (Proposition 7). Consequently, the equilibrium δ
must exceed δ.









Note that ∂¯ yi/∂di > 0 and ∂¯ yi/∂θ = (¯ yi(θ)−yi(θ))/(1−θ), where
∂¯ yL
∂θ > 0 for θL(τ);
∂¯ yL
∂θ < 0 for θR
L(τ) and
∂¯ yH
∂θ < 0 for θR
H(τ), since the latter thresholds are located to the
right of the maximal ¯ yi(θ). Thus higher dL reduces support for higher taxes among
L-voters while not a￿ecting H-voters, and higher dH reduces support for higher taxes
among H-voters and does not a￿ect L-voters. This implies that τ∗ decreases in di.
Proof of Proposition 10: The e￿ect of r on θi can be derived implicitly from















Note that ∂¯ yi/∂θ = (¯ yi(θ) − yi(θ))/(1 − θ) is positive at low thresholds and negative
at high, since the thresholds must be located on either side of the maximal ¯ yi(θ).
(θH(0) = 0 for δ = 1). Now, if we expand the numerator we get




This is strictly positive for H-types proving the ￿rst claim. Since 1
1−θ(ai + bir) is
greater at a higher threshold than at a lower one it follows that if the numerator
is negative at the lower threshold then this is also the case at the higher threshold.
Hence, we can rule out that dθL/dr < 0 and dθR
L/dr < 0. The other cases can occur.
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Figure 1b: The income distribution
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Figure 3: The tax rate as a function of the age of the baby-boom
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